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FIRST AMENDMENT - OBSCENITY
The 1970-71 term of the Second Circuit faced the problem of
walking the line between first amendment freedoms and government
regulation of obscenity. The Supreme Court has left this line vague
since it decided Roth v. United States.42 The modifications made by the
Court in Stanley v. Georgia43 have added to the confusion. Two recent
Second Circuit obscenity decisions are of particular import and must be
appraised in the light of subsequent Supreme Court decisions.
Following a jury verdict that the film was obscene, the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York directed
forfeiture and confiscation of the motion picture, "Language of Love." 44
Relying on section 305 of the Tariff Act of 1930,45 the tribunal dis-
missed the contention of the claimants that the statute, on its face, as
administered, and as applied to the film, was unconstitutional. That the
film could not be held "obscene" under current constitutional standards
shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the
witnesses.
FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
The district court found that the purpose of the transfer was to halt speech. It also
found actual harassment. Judge Oakes felt that Dombrowski was still applicable where
there was actual harassment. See note 38 supra. He also felt that the district court was
not bound by the army's proceeding under Article 138 of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 938 (1964), since it lacked "the usual safeguards of counsel, cross
examination and the submission of evidence."
42 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
43 394 U.S. 557 (1969). See Engdahl, Requiem for Roth: Obscenity Doctrine is Chang-
ing, 68 MICH. L. REv. 185 (1969); Karre, New Directions in Obscenity Regulation?, 48 TExAs
L. REv. 646 (1970). Katz, Privacy and Pornography: Stanley v. Georgia, 1969 Sup. CT. REv.
203, presents a variety of possible interpretations of the impact of Stanley.
44 United States v. 35 MM. Color Motion Picture Film "Language of Love," 312 F.
Supp. 1382 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). The film was seized by the Commissioner of Customs after its
arrival in New York from Sweden. The United States Attorney brought an action in the
district court for confiscation and forfeiture, pursuant to the Tariff Act. 19 U.S.C. § 1805
(1970)
45 19 U.S.C. § 1305 (1970) provides in part that
[a]ll persons are prohibited from importing into the United States from any
foreign country any ...obscene book, pamphlet, paper, writing, advertisement,
circular, print, picture, drawing, or other representation, figure, or image on or
of paper or other material, or any cast, instrument, or other article which is ob-
scene or immoral . . . .No such articles whether imported separately or con-
tained in packages with other goods entitled to entry, shall be admitted to entry;
and all such articles and, unless it appears to the satisfaction of the appropriate
customs officer that the obscene or other prohibited articles contained in the
package were inclosed therein without the knowledge or consent of the im-
porter, owner, agent, or consignee, the entire contents of the package in which
such articles are contained, shall be subject to seizure and forfeiture as here-
inafter provided: ... Provided further, That the Secretary of the Treasury may, in
his discretion, admit the so-called classics or books of recognized and established
literary or scientific merit, but may, in his discretion, admit such classics or books
only when imported for noncommercial purposes.
SECOND CIRCUIT NOTE
was likewise rejected. The claimants appealed to the court of appeals. 46
The Second Circuit considered the jury's vedict on the obscene
nature of a work to be at best an advisory opinion. Classification as
obscene or not obscene is determinative of the right to constitutional
protection under the tvo-level theory of speech formulated in Roth v.
United States.47 Therefore, the Second Circuit acknowledged its obliga-
tion to make an independent determination.48
Assured that a trial de novo of the jury's obscenity determination
was in order, the court of appeals viewed as determinative the manner
in which sex was presented in the film, rather than its frequency,
variety, or explicitness per se.49 The court distinguished the film's
arousal of sexual instincts from a perversion of those instincts to mor-
bidity and concluded that the film as a whole could not be considered
an appeal to prurient interests.5 0 It further concluded that the film was
not obscene51 under the three-part test promulgated in Memoirs v.
4G United States v. 35 MM. Motion Picture Film "Language of Love," 432 F.2d 705
(2d Cir. 1970).
47 354 U.s. 476 (1957).
48 432 F.2d at 709-11. The court found precedent for this conclusion in Justice Harlan's
separate opinion in Roth, 554 U.S. at 497-98:
Every communication has an individuality and "value" of its own. The sup-
pression of a particular writing or other tangible form of expression is, therefore,
an individual matter, and in the nature of things every such suppression raises
an individual constitutional problem, in which a reviewing court must determine
for itself whether the attacked expression is suppressable within constitutional
standards. Since those standards do not readily lend themselves to generalized
definitions, the constitutional problem in the last analysis becomes one of partic-
ularized judgments which appellate courts must make for themselves.
I do not think that reviewing courts can escape this responsibility by saying
that the trier of the facts, be it a jury or a judge, has labeled the questioned
matter as "obscene," for, if "obscenity" is to be suppressed, the question whether
a particular work is of that character involves not really an issue of fact but a
question of constitutional judgment of the most sensitive and delicate kind.
Justice Harlan was joined by Justice Stewart for a further presentation of this position,
writing for the Court in Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 488 (1962). The
Supreme Court later adopted this approach in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964),
when Justice Brennan remarked that
[s]ince it is only "obscenity" that is excluded from the constitutional protection,
the question whether a particular work is obscene necessarily implicates an issue
of constitutional law. . . .Such an issue, we think, must ultimately be decided
by this Court.
378 U.S. at 188.
The Second Circuit, itself, had previously relied on these decisions to determine that
the decisional task was placed on judges as a natural consequence of the emphasis on a
national decency standard. United States v. A Motion Picture Entitled "I Am Curious(Yellow)," 404 F.2d 199, 201-02 (2d Cir. 1968).
49 432 F.2d at 708.
rold. at 712. In Roth, The Supreme Court had defined a work as obscene when,
to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant
theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest.
354 U.S. at 489.
51432 F.2d at 709.
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Massachusetts.52 Sequences of the film were offensive, the Court ob-
served, not through an excitement of predilections to prurience, but
through an intrusion upon peculiarly private areas of interpersonal
relations. De gustibus non disputandum est, and offenses to sensibilities
were deemed a matter of taste. Considerations of taste being appropriate
only to "patent offensiveness to prevailing community standards," the
court dismissed offensiveness alone as an insufficient ground for censor-
ship.53 The dominant theme or revealed purpose of the film was central
to the court's determination of the existence of social value and the
nature of the film's appeal. 54 This theme was found to be the revelation
and solution of sexual problems. As such, the court determined that the
film advocated ideas, was not without redeeming social value, and,
therefore, was entitled to first amendment protection. 55
Next, the Second Circuit considered the possibility that the legiti-
mate film might be presented by the distributors to the public in a con-
text which constituted "pandering." 56 In such instances, the court
noted, the focus is upon the conduct of the distributor; his evaluation
of the material being indicative of his purpose.57 The Second Circuit
pointed out, however, that, while such evidence was central to a crim-
inal prosecution against the distributor, this was a civil proceeding
against the film itself to determine whether the film may be imported
into the country for any purpose at all.58 For these purposes, a criminal
conviction, such as that in Ginzburg v. United States, "does not neces-
sarily suppress the materials in question, nor chill their proper distribu-
tion for a proper use." 59
52 A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney
Gen., 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
For a work to be obscene, three elements must coalesce: it must be established
that (a) the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to a pru-
rient interest in sex; (b) the material is patently offensive because it affronts
contemporary community standards relating to the description or representation
of sexual matters; and (c) the material is utterly without redeeming social value.
Id. at 418.
53432 F.2d at 711.
54 d. at 712.
55 Id. at 713.
56 Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 475-76 (1966):
Where an exploitation of interests in titillation by pornography is shown
with respect to material lending itself to such exploitation through pervasive
treatment or description of sexual matters, such evidence may support the deter-
mination that the material is obscene even though in other contexts the material
would escape such condemnation.
57432 F.2d at 714.
58 Id.
59 383 U.S. at 475. The Second Circuit, in "Language of Love," added:
Our case is not a narrowly directed criminal prosecution, and forfeiture pursuant
to § 305 [Tariff Act of 1930] would suppress the material entirely and condemn
it in all contexts. This the First Amendment forbids unless the material itself is
proscribably obscene.
432 F.2d at 714.
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The court of appeals finally cautioned that though the film could
not be proscribed as "obscene" by adult standards, statutes reflecting
specific and limited state concerns could nevertheless be the basis for
future prosecutions subsequent to distribution. The court cited the
protection of minors and protection against affronts to the innocent
citizen as state interests which could be enforced against publication of
the film.00 Given adequate measures against exhibition to minors and
regulations requiring "truth in exhibition" by the local exhibitor, how-
ever, the court noted, it is not the general public which is exposed to
possibly offensive movies, but a very specific audience composed of
persons who have freely submitted themselves to exposure. 61 Thus, it
emphasized that local communities are not powerless to protect them-
selves against encroachments on their own limits of decency. Prior re-
straint on the national level, however, would not be applied by the
court to bar the importation of material that was not obscene per se,
but merely objectionable to some.62
On facts similar to those of United States v. 35 MM. Motion Pic-
ture Film, "Language of Love,"63 the Supreme Court was more willing
to apply a prior restraint to the importation of allegedly obscene photo-
graphs in United States v. Thirty-Seven (37) Photographs.64 In this sub-
sequent decision, a majority of the Court upheld the constitutionality
of section 305(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930,65 by reading into it the
60432 F.2d at 714-15. These considerations had been developed in Redrup v. New
York, 386 US. 767, 769 (1967).
61432 F.2d at 714-15.
62 As a federal court charged with the delicate responsibility of guarding the
First Amendment's guarantee of free expression, we cannot interdict at the
border, and for all purposes, a film which does not meet the rigid criteria estab-
lished by the Supreme Court as the sine qua non for suppression.
Id. at 715.
63 432 F.2d 705 (1970).
64402 U.S. 363 (1971).
645 19 U.S.C. § 1305(a), note 45 supra, provides further:
Upon the appearance of any such book or matter at any customs office, the
same shall be seized and held by the appropriate customs officer to await thejudgment of the district court as hereinafter provided; and no protest shall be
taken to the United States Customs Court from the decision of such customs
officer. Upon the seizure of such book or matter such customs officer shall trans-
mit information thereof to the district attorney of the district in which is
situated the office at which such seizure has taken place, who shall institute
proceedings in the district court for the forfeiture, confiscation, and destruction
of the book or matter seized. Upon the adjudication that such book or matter
thus seized is of the character the entry of which is by this section prohibited,
it shall be ordered destroyed and shall be destroyed. Upon adjudication that such
book or matter thus seized is not of the character the entry of which is by this
section prohibited, it shall not be excluded from entry under the provisions of
this section.
In any such proceeding any party in interest may upon demand have the
facts at issue determined by a jury and any party may have an appeal or the right
of review as in the case of ordinary actions or suits.
19 U.S.C. § 1305(a) (1970).
1972]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:425
procedural requirements of Freedman v. Maryland.6  Having thus
sidestepped the claimant's procedural argument, 7 the Court allowed
application of the statute for the forfeiture of allegedly obscene photo-
graphs taken from claimant's personal luggage. A plurality of the
Court 8 held that any right to receive obscenity suggested by Stanley v.
Georgia9 does not extend to the distribution of obscene materials to
the public or to the importation of obscene materials from abroad,
whether for strictly private use or public distribution."0 Thus the Court
found the purpose of Stanley to be the protection of the sanctity of a
person's house. Possession of obscene photographs on one's person or in
one's personal luggage was deemed outside the scope of this protection.
The Court's holding in Thirty-Seven Photographs is consistent
with the decision of the Second Circuit in "Language of Love." The
66 Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965) struck down a state licensing system
for motion pictures, holding
that, because only a judicial determination in an adversary proceeding ensures
the necessary sensitivity to freedom of expression, only a procedure requiring
a judicial determination suffices to impose a valid final restraint.
Id. at 58.
To insure prompt judicial interpretation and to prevent administrative delay from
itself becoming a form of censorship, Freedman further required assurance, (I) "... by
statute or authoritative judicial construction, that the censor will, within a specified
brief period, either issue a license or go to court to restrain showing the film"; (2) [that]
[a]ny restraint imposed in advance of a final judicial determination on the merits must
similarly be limited to preservation of the status quo for the shortest fixed period com-
patible with sound judicial resolution"; (3) "... [that] the procedure must also assure a
prompt final judicial decision" to minimize the damage caused by faulty administrative
actions. Id. at 58-59.
The Supreme Court in Thirty-Seven Photographs amended section 1305(a) to meet
these due process requirements:
Accordingly, we construe § 1305(a) [U.S.C.] to require intervals of no more than
14 days from seizure of the goods to the institution of judicial proceedings for
their forfeiture and no longer than 60 days from the filing of the action to final
decision in the District Court. No seizure or forfeiture will be invalidated for
delay, however, where the claimant is responsible for extending either adminis-
trative action or judicial determination beyond the allowable time limits or
where administrative or judicial proceedings are postponed pending the con-
sideration of constitutional issues appropriate only for a three-judge court.
402 U.S. at 373-74.
67 402 U.S. at 568. See criticism of the Court's approach, id. at 383 et seq. (Black,
J. dissenting).
68 Chief Justice Burger, Justices Blackmun, Brennan and White.
69 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
70 By the same token, obscene materials may be removed from the channels of
commerce when discovered in the luggage of a returning foreign traveler even
though intended solely for his private use. That the private user under Stanley
may not be prosecuted for possession of obscenity in his home does not mean
that he is entitled to import it from abroad free from the power of Congress to
exclude noxious articles from commerce. Stanley's emphasis was on the freedom
of thought and mind in the privacy of the home. But a port of entry is not a
traveler's home. His right to be left alone neither prevents the search of his
luggage nor the seizure of unprotected, but illegal, materials when his possession
of them is discovered during such a search.
402 U.S. at 376-77.
SECOND CIRCUIT NOTE
Second Circuit thoroughly analyzed the film before concluding that
"Language of Love" was not obscene per se. That the film could not
be denied entry into this country was the natural result of this finding.
The constitutionality of section 305 of the Tariff Act of 1930 and the
right of privacy requirements of Stanley were not before the court. In
Thirty-Seven Photographs, on the other hand, the Supreme Court was
not asked to determine the obscenity of the photographs, but rather,
assumed arguendo that they were obscene. The importer of the pictures
relied on an alleged constitutional guarantee of the privacy of his per-
sonal luggage, regardless of the obscene nature of the pictures therein.
His cause failed when the Court chose Thirty-Seven Photographs as an
opportunity to curtail sweeping applications of Stanley.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals had an opportunity to apply
Stanley in United States v. Dellapia.71 In so doing, the court joined the
minority of jurisdictions which have given Stanley a broad construc-
tion.72
Dellapia responded to a personal notice in a magazine seeking
"photo-collectors and liberal-minded couples." Correspondence devel-
oped between the parties, including an exchange of obscene films con-
ducted through the mails. Dellapia was convicted of violating the
Comstock Act73 after a package of films he had mailed at the request of
his correspondents was intercepted by postal inspectors. On appeal, the
Second Circuit judged that the films were "obscene in the constitu-
tional sense." 74 Recognizing that under Stanley the right to privacy of
thought does not extend to "public distribution or dissemination" of
71433 F.2d 1252 (1970), reviewed in 12 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 691 (1971).
72 A list of such cases is presented in Note, Obscenity Law: Aprs Stanley, Le Deluge?,
17 CATHOLIc LAw. 45, 55 n.92 (1971). The article also provides a list of cases which have
limited Stanley to its facts, id. at 53 n.75.
73 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1970) provides in part:
Every obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, filthy or vile article, matter, thing,
device, or substance
Is declared to be nonmailable matter and shall not be conveyed in the mails
or delivered from any post office or by any letter carrier.
Whoever knowingly uses the mails for the mailing, carriage in the mails,
or delivery of anything declared by this section to be nonmailable, or knowingly
causes to be delivered by mail according to the direction thereon, or at the
place at which it is directed to be delivered by the person to whom it is addressed,
or knowingly takes any such thing from the mails for the purpose of circulating
or disposing thereof, or of aiding in the circulation or disposition thereof, shall
be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both,
for the first such offense, and shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned
not more than ten years, or both, for each such offense thereafter.
18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1970). See commentary in Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 562 n.7
(1969).
74 433 F.2d at 1254.
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obscene materials, 75 the Second Circuit theorized that a private sharing
was nevertheless within the scope of Stanley's protection. 76 Invasions of
such private consensual relationships, the court concluded, must be
constitutionally justified by a trespass on a valid governmental in-
terest.77 Applying this requirement to the Comstock Act's broad pro-
hibitions against obscene mailings avoided consideration by the court
of the Act's constitutionality. 7
Rejecting the notion that the protection of society or the corre-
spondents from their own immorality is within the scope of legitimate
governmental interest, the court of appeals singled out the protection
of minors and the preservation of public decency as within this in-
terest.7 9 Since (1) no pandering or public affront could be shown that
might bruise the sensibilities of third persons, (2) Dellapia guarded
against any exposure to minors, and (3) the correspondence was free
of commercial motive, the court concluded that Dellapia's private cor-
respondence could not be prohibited. 0
This decision suggests that the Second Circuit has run afoul of the
Supreme Court's edicts in the companion case to Thirty-Seven Photo-
graphs, United States v. Reidel.81 Reidel mailed copies of an allegedly
obscene booklet to willing recipients who stated that they were over
twenty-one years of age. Holding that his delivery was constitutionally
75 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 561 (1969). The Supreme Court had summarily
affirmed a district court holding that Stanley did not prevent application of Georgia's
obscenity statute to book sellers. Gable v. Jenkins, 397 U.S. 592 (1970), aff'g 309 F. Supp.
998 (N.D. Ga. 1969).
76 433 F.2d at 1255.
Clearly, the Court did not intend that one forfeit the shelter of Stanley merely
by sharing his private collection of obscenity with another for his private use.
• . . Dellapia was neither indicted nor convicted for "public" distribution within
the meaning of Stanley. Since the government has shown no special circum-
stances that would justify its prosecution of Dellapia in the face of Stanley, his
conviction must be reversed.
Id. at 1255-56.
[t]here is no evidence in the record to sustain a finding that this was anything
but a "private exchange." There was not a shred of evidence that Dellapia
offered the films for sale to the general public. Nor did the government show
that Dellapia made a profit on his transactions with Gerard.
Id. at 1255 n.ll.
Private communication seems no less part of freedom than privacy to read one's
own books. If not, then the privacy that Stanley held inviolable is less robust
than we would have thought.
Id. at 1259.
77 Id. at 1260.
78 1d. at 1259-60. This is comparable to the Supreme Court's subsequent attempt in
Thirty-Seven Photographs to save section 805 of the Tariff Act from constitutional attack.
See note 66 supra and accompanying text.
79433 F.2d at 1256-59.
80Id. at 1256-60.
81402 U.S. 351 (1971). For discussion of both Thirty-Seven Photographs and Reidel
see note, Obscenity Law: Le Deluge Postponed, 17 CATHOLic LAw. 255 (1971).
SECOND CIRCUIT NOTE
protected, the district court dismissed the indictment against Ridel for
violation of section 1461 (18 U.S.C.).82 The Supreme Court reversed
this judgment, relying on an earlier section 1461 conviction in Roth.
Thus the Roth espousal that "obscenity is not within the area of con-
stitutionally protected speech or press"83 was reinforced, and Stanley
was restricted to its facts. While the Court had asserted in Stanley that
mere private possession of obscene matter cannot be constitutionally
proscribed, it was now barring a means by which private possession
might be acquired.
Upon closer inspection, however, distinctions present themselves
which may reconcile Dellapia and Reidel. The Supreme Court relied
heavily on the fact that Reidel was dealing in obscenity as a commercial
enterprise, and was employing the services of the postal system in the
furtherance of his moneymaking scheme. 4 This was too much for
the Court. It violated all possible interpretations of section 1461, and
sought to capitalize on the right of privacy. In Dellapia, on the other
hand, the Second Circuit predicated its holding on the fact that Del-
lapia's activities were noncommercial.8 5 Stanley's protection of private
possession and enjoyment may readily be held to cover a small group's
private possession and enjoyment. Postal exchanges of obscene material
within the group would not violate the purpose of this protection.
However, Stanley clearly may not be extended to cover the commercial
realm. Entrepreneurs may not seek the shelter of Stanley while bla-
tantly violating its purpose. Public peddlers of pornography may not
label their activities as private, when those activities consist of soliciting
and publicly distributing obscene material, and thus offending the
public conscience.8 0
82 See note 73 supra. The Ninth Circuit has recently sustained convictions under 18
U.S.C. § 1461 (1964) in accordance with the Supreme Court's later holding in Reidel. See
United States v. Jacobs, 433 F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1970); Miller v. United States, 431 F.2d
655 (9th Cir. 1970).
83 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957).
84 402 U.S. at 356 (opinion of the Court), 357 (Harlan, J., concurring).
85 The distinction between commercial and non-commercial conveyances of obscene
matter was endorsed in United States v. New Orleans Book Mart, Inc., 328 F. Supp. 136,
143-46 (E.D. La. 1971). In Redmond v. United States, 384 U.S. 264 (1966), the Solicitor
General moved to vacate a judgment of conviction for mailing private correspondence
containing allegedly obscene matter. The Court granted the motion per curiam since
such prosecution was against the policies of the Justice Department. The concurring
opinion of Justices Stewart, Black and Douglas declared that irrespective of what the
policies of the Justice Department happened to be, prosecution for such a private mailing
was in violation of the Constitution. Id. at 265.
86 In New Orleans Book Mart the district court held that a commercial distributor of
obscene material lacked standing to attack the constitutionality of sections 1462 and 1465
for overbreadth. While a literal reading of the acts would prohibit both commercial and
private transportation of obscene materials, the court limited application of the acts
1972]
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Synthesizing Reidel and Thirty-Seven Photographs against the
background of Roth and Stanley, it may be postulated that while ob-
scenity is not protected by the first amendment, the right to privacy is.
Commercial transactions in obscene materials are clearly outside the
scope of privacy; private communications, by mail or otherwise, are
not.87 Legitimate governmental interests, however, may outweigh the
interest of the preservation of privacy. These special governmental in-
terests include, but are not necessarily limited to, the protection of
minors, the protection of society against affronts to public decency,
and the protection of society from foreign obscenity.88 The Second
to commercial activities. Such a rule, the court maintained, would excise most of the
overbreadth and eliminate much of the chill, thus rendering an expansive approach to
standing unnecessary. 328 F. Supp. 136, 145, 146 (E.D. La. 1971).
87 As early as 1877 the Supreme Court assured that the Constitution prevented the
Comstock Act from subjecting letters and sealed packages to unreasonable searches and
seizures, in Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877):
The power possessed by Congress embraces the regulation of the entire postal
system of the country. The right to designate what shall be carried necessarily
involves the right to determine what shall be excluded. The difficulty attending
the subject arises, not from the want of power in Congress to prescribe regula-
tions as to what shall constitute mail matter, but from the necessity of enforcing
them consistently with rights reserved to the people, of far greater importance
than the transportation of the mail. In their enforcement, a distinction is to be
made between different kinds of mail matter, - between what is intended to be
kept free from inspection, such as letters, and sealed packages subject to letter
postage; and what is open to inspection, such as newspapers, magazines, pam-
phlets, and other printed matter, purposely left in a condition to be examined.
Letters and sealed packages of this kind in the mail are as fully guarded from
examination and inspection, except as to their outward form and weight, as if
they were retained by the parties forwarding them in their own domiciles. The
constitutional guaranty of the right of the people to be secure in their papers
against unreasonable searches and seizures extends to their papers, thus closed
against inspection, wherever they may be. Whilst in the mail, they can only
be opened and examined under like warrant, issued upon similar oath or
affirmation, particularly describing the thing to be seized, as is required when
papers are subjected to search in one's own household. No law of Congress can
place in the hands of officials connected with the postal service any authority
to invade the secrecy of letters and such sealed packages in the mail; and all
regulations adopted as to mail matter of this kind must be in subordination to
the great principle embodied in the fourth amendment of the Constitution.
96 U.S. at 732-33 (emphasis added).
Jackson thus serves to emphasize that constitutional protections of privacy apply
equally to sealed private correspondence through the mails at they do to effects in the
home. The protections that Stanley affords to the private possession of obscenity in the
home, therefore, likewise extend to such matter when in sealed private correspondence.
88 Giving Stanley a more limited scope than that necessarily warranted by Reidel would
lead to the conclusion that the mail is another such special governmental interest. Jack-
son lends support to this argument with the proviso that no unreasonable searches or
seizures be employed in the enforcement of that interest:
Whilst regulations excluding matter from the mail cannot be enforced in a
way which would require or permit an examination into letters, or sealed
packages subject to letter postage, without warrant, issued upon oath or affirma-
tion, in the search for prohibited matter, they may be enforced upon competent
evidence of their violation obtained in other ways; as from the parties receiving
the letters or packages, or from agents depositing them in the post office, or others
cognizant of the facts.
96 U.S. at 735.
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Circuit's decisions and reasoning in Dellapia and "Language of Love"
are in full concert with such state of the law.
ZONING - EQUAL PROTECTION
Until recent years, urban life was comparatively simple; but with
the great increase and concentration of population, problems have
developed, and constantly are developing, which require, and will
continue to require, additional restrictions in respect to use and
occupation of private lands in urban communities.89
Inherent to the problem forseen by the Supreme Court in Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co.90 is the difficult task of providing equal protection
of the law to all citizens, and developing a viable community.91 Current
standards of equal protection demand a re-evaluation of zoning prin-
ciples. 92 Discretionary powers of local governments have always created
a deep concern about the constitutionality of zoning ordinances.9 3
Under this reasoning, it is significant that Dellapia did not involve an arbitrary postal
inspection, but rather evidence obtained from the recipient. While Dellapia's prosecution
would not, therefore, violate the Jackson rule, its vulnerability to a reasonable reading of
Stanley would remain.
89 Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). In this early case the Court
approved a comprehensive zoning ordinance. The village of Euclid had adopted a zoning
plan which was attacked as denying liberty and property without due process and denying
equal protection of the law. It was considered a liberal and tolerant attitude compared
to prior decisions of the period. See Ribble, The Due Process Clause as a Limitation on
Mutual Discretion in Zoning Legislation, 16 VA. L. ERv. 689, 699 (1930).
90272 US. 865 (1926).
91 See generally Note, Judicial Review of Displacee Relocation in Urban Renewal, 77
YArL L.J. 966, 967 (1968). The difficulty lies in the relationship of economic and racial
classes. Legislation which segregates economic classes by setting minimum building plots
or minimum values of particular areas are subject to constitutional scrutiny as contra-
dictory to traditional notions of equal protection. In Shelly v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1, 20
(1943), the Court stated that "freedom from discrimination by the States in enjoyment of
property rights" is imperative. When state action is inescapably adverse to the enjoy-
ment of this right, the city must show a compelling government interest in order to
overcome a finding of unconstitutionality. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
See also Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Ass'n, 347 U.S. 971 (1954); Adickes v. S.H.
Kress & Co., 252 F. Supp. 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
92 Different approaches to zoning have been used, all of which tend to discriminate
economically and therefore racially:
(1) Minimum size building lots. See Note, Large Lot Zoning, 78 YALE L.J. 1418 (1969).
This article contains a discussion of the efficiency, desirability and possible al-
ternatives of large lot zoning.
(2) Minimum floor space. See Note, Zoning for Minimum Standards, The Wayne
Township Case, HAav. L. Rxv. 1051, 1057 (1953), for a discussion of the rela-
tionship of state police power (health, safety, morals and welfare) to citizens and
certain zoning ordinances.
(3) Strict building codes which raise the cost of erection.
(4) Prohibition of multiple dwellings. See Babcock & Bosselman, Suburban Zoning
and the Apartment Boom, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 1040, 1062-68 (1963). See also Wil-
liams, Planning Law and Democratic Living, 20 Lmw & CONTEMP. PROB. 317, 331
(1955).
9 3 In Euclid, a land owner questioned the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance
1972]
